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Article Dans Une Revue Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics Année : 2006

Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets

Résumé

This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to the electricity industry. The analysis is dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very details of the market rules or institution, that is the auction rule. We argue that these experimental results contribute to a better understanding of the performances properties and implementation features of competitive market designs and that experimental economics has proven very useful to public authorities to inform the restructuring of electricity industry. It thus confirms the role of experimental economics as a complement to theoretical approaches in the design effort.
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Dates et versions

hal-00569121 , version 1 (25-02-2011)

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Carine Staropoli, Celine Jullien. Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2006, 77 (4), pp.555-577. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00319.x⟩. ⟨hal-00569121⟩
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