The Bounded Core for Games with Precedence Constraints

Michel Grabisch (1) , Peter Sudhölter (2)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 Department of Business and Economics

An element of the possibly unbounded core of a cooperative game with precedence constraints belongs to its bounded core if any transfer to a player from any of her subordinates results in payoffs outside the core. The bounded core is the union of all bounded faces of the core, it is nonempty if the core is nonempty, and it is a continuous correspondence on games with coinciding precedence constraints. If the precedence constraints generate a connected hierarchy, then the core is always nonempty. It is shown that the bounded core is axiomatized similarly to the core for classical co- operative games, namely by boundedness (BOUND), nonemptiness for zero-inessential two-person games (ZIG), anonymity, covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), and certain variants of the reduced game property (RGP), the converse reduced game property (CRGP), and the reconfirmation property. The core is the maximum solution that satisfies a suitably weakened version of BOUND together with the remaining axioms. For games with connected hierarchies, the bounded core is axiomatized by BOUND, ZIG, COV, and some variants of RGP and CRGP, whereas the core is the maximum solution that satisfies the weakened version of BOUND, COV, and the variants of RGP and CRGP.

Mots clés: Restricted cooperation; TU game; Core

Domaines: Mathématique discrète [cs.DM]; Economies et finances; Recherche opérationnelle [math.OC]

Michel Grabisch, Peter Sudhölter. The Bounded Core for Games with Precedence Constraints. Annals of Operations Research, 2012, 201 (1), pp.251-264. ⟨10.1007/s10479-012-1228-9⟩. ⟨hal-00759893⟩