Sidgwick, Moore et l'approche économique de l'utilité des règles ordinaires
Résumé
This article is a study of naturalistic reasoning in the analyses by Henry Sidgwick and George Edward Moore concerning the usefulness of ordinary ethical rules. Background evolutionary assumptions and observations of the natural conditions of typical human interaction play a decisive role, as well as a specific attention to cognitive limitations in the human species. More recent decision-theoretic and economic analyses can sometimes bring more precision to remarkable insights of these authors. They illustrate the connection between classical philosophical arguments and the economic approaches to information and decision. This article is a study of naturalistic reasoning in the analyses by Henry Sidgwick and George Edward Moore concerning the usefulness of ordinary ethical rules. Background evolutionary assumptions and observations of the natural conditions of typical human interaction play a decisive role, as well as a specific attention to cognitive limitations in the human species. More recent decision-theoretic and economic analyses can sometimes bring more precision to remarkable insights of these authors. They illustrate the connection between classical philosophical arguments and the economic approaches to information and decision. This article is a study of naturalistic reasoning in the analyses by Henry Sidgwick and George Edward Moore concerning the usefulness of ordinary ethical rules. Background evolutionary assumptions and observations of the natural conditions of typical human interaction play a decisive role, as well as a specific attention to cognitive limitations in the human species. More recent decision-theoretic and economic analyses can sometimes bring more precision to remarkable insights of these authors. They illustrate the connection between classical philosophical arguments and the economic approaches to information and decision. This article is a study of naturalistic reasoning in the analyses by Henry Sidgwick and George Edward Moore concerning the usefulness of ordinary ethical rules. Background evolutionary assumptions and observations of the natural conditions of typical human interaction play a decisive role, as well as a specific attention to cognitive limitations in the human species. More recent decision-theoretic and economic analyses can sometimes bring more precision to remarkable insights of these authors. They illustrate the connection between classical philosophical arguments and the economic approaches to information and decision. This article is a study of naturalistic reasoning in the analyses by Henry Sidgwick and George Edward Moore concerning the usefulness of ordinary ethical rules. Background evolutionary assumptions and observations of the natural conditions of typical human interaction play a decisive role, as well as a specific attention to cognitive limitations in the human species. More recent decision-theoretic and economic analyses can sometimes bring more precision to remarkable insights of these authors. They illustrate the connection between classical philosophical arguments and the economic approaches to information and decision.
Cet article est consacré aux arguments naturalistes mobilisés par Henry Sidgwick et par George Edward Moore dans l'analyse de l'utilité des règles morales ordinaires. Les hypothèses évolutionnistes d'arrière-plan et l'observation des conditions naturelles des interactions humaines typiques jouent un rôle décisif dans ce contexte, de même que l'attention spécifique aux limitations cognitives dans l'espèce humaine. Sur certains points, des analyses décisionnelles et économiques plus récentes viennent préciser des intuitions remarquables de ces auteurs et donnent un aperçu des rapports qui se nouent entre des arguments philosophiques classiques et les approches économiques de l'information et de la décision.