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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2012

Antirealism and the self-ascription of attitudes

Résumé

In a nutshell, semantic antirealism is the doctrine that if a statement is true, then it must be possible, at least in principle, to determine that it is true. Consider the particular case of self-ascriptions of attitudes such as beliefs, desires and intentions, i.e. statements of the form "I φ [that] p", where φ ranges over propositional attitude verbs and p provides the content of whatever is φd by the self-ascriber. Should we be semantic antirealists about these when the putative bearer of the attitude is the only individual who may retrieve a warrant in favour of his φing that p? We can't provide an answer to the question unless we're clear about (i) whether or not the "at least in principle" clause is too weak, and (ii) what the right construal of positive introspection should look like. 2 Thus two issues: strict finitism on the one hand and the phenomenological nature of introspective warrants on the other. I shall argue that recent views defended by Peacocke and Pryor are found wanting with respect to both.

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Dates et versions

halshs-00792336 , version 1 (21-02-2013)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00792336 , version 1

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Fabrice Pataut. Antirealism and the self-ascription of attitudes. Sixième Congrès de la Société de Philosophie Analytique, May 2012, Paris, France. ⟨halshs-00792336⟩
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