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Journal Articles Mathematics of Operations Research Year : 2015

Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs


We introduce the concept of attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs. A set of payoff vectors is called attainable by a player if there is a finite horizon T such that the player can guarantee that after time T the distance between the set and the cumulative payoff is arbitrarily small, regardless of the strategy Player 2 is using. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the attainability of a convex set, using the concept of B-sets. We then particularize the condition to the case in which the set is a singleton, and provide some equivalent conditions. We finally characterize when all vectors are attainable.
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hal-01302514 , version 1 (14-04-2016)



Dario Bauso, Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan, Xavier Venel. Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2015, 40 (3), pp.739-755. ⟨10.1287/moor.2014.0693⟩. ⟨hal-01302514⟩
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