Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness

Jean Beuve (1) , Claudine Desrieux (2)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit

Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts. We would like to thank

Keywords: Incomplete contract; relational contract; reputation

Domains: Economics and Finance

Jean Beuve, Claudine Desrieux. Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness . Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (3), pp.2030 - 2040. ⟨hal-01463000⟩