Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness

Abstract : Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts. We would like to thank
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Jean Beuve, Claudine Desrieux. Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness . Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (3), pp.2030 - 2040. ⟨hal-01463000⟩

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