Abstract : Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts. We would like to thank
https://hal-paris1.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01463000
Contributeur : Jean Beuve
<>
Soumis le : jeudi 9 février 2017 - 12:15:07
Dernière modification le : mercredi 16 mai 2018 - 22:46:03
Document(s) archivé(s) le : mercredi 10 mai 2017 - 13:00:38
Jean Beuve, Claudine Desrieux. Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness . Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (3), pp.2030 - 2040. 〈hal-01463000〉
