Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness

Abstract : Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts. We would like to thank
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [11 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-paris1.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01463000
Contributor : Jean Beuve <>
Submitted on : Thursday, February 9, 2017 - 12:15:07 PM
Last modification on : Sunday, January 19, 2020 - 6:38:27 PM
Document(s) archivé(s) le : Wednesday, May 10, 2017 - 1:00:38 PM

File

EB-11-V31-I3-P183.pdf
Publisher files allowed on an open archive

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01463000, version 1

Collections

Citation

Jean Beuve, Claudine Desrieux. Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness . Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (3), pp.2030 - 2040. ⟨hal-01463000⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

178

Files downloads

149