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David Hume and Rationality in Decision-Making: A Case Study on the Economic Reading of a Philosopher

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Abstract

This paper shows that Hume's theory of passion, such as elaborated mainly in book II of the Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) and in the Dissertation on the Passions (1757), gives rise to a conception of the decision process which challenges the canonical approach to the rationality of decision, as rationality of preferences or rationality of choice. It shows that when adopting a Humean perspective, rationality is not embodied as consistency requirements of individual behaviour, but may emerge as a possible outcome of some dispositions of our mind, which make the world inhabited by our emotions.
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hal-01831901 , version 1 (06-07-2018)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01831901 , version 1

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André Lapidus. David Hume and Rationality in Decision-Making: A Case Study on the Economic Reading of a Philosopher. R. Ege and H. Igersheim (eds), The Individual and the Other in Economic Thought, 2019. ⟨hal-01831901⟩

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