Multicoalitional solutions
Résumé
The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called
multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games,
that is, where $v(S)$ is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast
to classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoff vectors,
multicoalitional solutions give in addition an allocation time to each
coalition, which permits to realize the payoff vector. We give two instances of
such solutions, called the d-multicoalitional core and the c-multicoalitional
core, and both arise as the strong Nash equilibria of two strategic games, where in the
first utility per active unit of time is maximized, while in the second it is
the utility per total unit of time. We show that the d-core (or aspiration core)
of Benett, and the c-core of Guesnerie and Oddou are strongly related to the
d-multicoalitional and c-multicoalitional cores, respectively, and that the
latter ones can be seen as an implementation of the former ones in a
noncooperative framework.
Domaines
Economies et finances
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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