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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Theory Année : 2020

Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

Résumé

We analyze the robustness of equilibria in sequential games when there is almost common certainty of payoffs. We show that a generic extensive-form game may have no robust equilibrium behavior, but has at least one robust equilibrium outcome, which is induced by a proper equilibrium in its normal-form representation. Therefore, backward induction leads to a unique robust outcome in a generic perfect-information game. We also discuss close relation between robustness to incomplete information and strategic stability. Finally, we present the implications of our results for the robustness of subgame-perfect implementation.
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halshs-02875199 , version 1 (20-05-2022)

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Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale

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Satoru Takahashi, Olivier Tercieux. Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs. Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 188, ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2020.105068⟩. ⟨halshs-02875199⟩
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