Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game

Dmitry Levando (1, 2)

1 HSE - Vysšaja škola èkonomiki = National Research University Higher School of Economics [Moscow]
2 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne

The paper defines a family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous finite games to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. Every game has two outcomes - an allocation of players over coalitions and a payoff profile for every player. Every game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. The equilibrium can generate more than one coalition with a presence of intra and inter group externalities. These properties make it different from the Shapley value, strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus. The paper demonstrates some applications: non-cooperative cooperation, Bayesian game, stochastic games and construction of a non-cooperative criterion of coalition structure stability for studying focal points. An example demonstrates that a payoff profile in the Prisoners' Dilemma is non-informative to deduce a cooperation of players.

Mots clés: Noncooperative games

Domaines: Economies et finances

Dmitry Levando. Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game. 2017. ⟨halshs-01491935v1⟩