Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game

Abstract : The paper defines a family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous finite games to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. Every game has two outcomes - an allocation of players over coalitions and a payoff profile for every player. Every game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. The equilibrium can generate more than one coalition with a presence of intra and inter group externalities. These properties make it different from the Shapley value, strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus. The paper demonstrates some applications: non-cooperative cooperation, Bayesian game, stochastic games and construction of a non-cooperative criterion of coalition structure stability for studying focal points. An example demonstrates that a payoff profile in the Prisoners' Dilemma is non-informative to deduce a cooperation of players.
Type de document :
Autre publication
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2017.15 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2017
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01491935
Contributeur : Lucie Label <>
Soumis le : vendredi 17 mars 2017 - 16:21:05
Dernière modification le : samedi 18 mars 2017 - 01:11:42

Fichier

17015.pdf
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01491935, version 1

Collections

Citation

Dmitry Levando. Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game. Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2017.15 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2017. <halshs-01491935>

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de
la notice

100

Téléchargements du document

269